After the shoot down of the American aircraft in the air corridor to West Berlin, the gravity of the situation was better understood by all. This was far worse than in 1948-49. West Berliners were more than worried, for they knew, more than anyone else, that they could not last for long.
Many in the American administration had been convinced that since the coupe ousting Khrushchev, the Soviets were following a path to war. Eisenhower finally gave in, agreeing that war seemed inevitable. Convincing some of their NATO allies had been challenging, regardless of Soviet actions. Despite the Soviet escalation, the isolation of West Berlin had still come as a surprise to the US, and forced Eisenhower's hand.
Rather than having to hold back an avalanche of Soviet forces marching into the federal Republic, it seemed that NATO would have to be the first to cross the inner German border. The Warsaw pact nations held a huge advantage in manpower, but the US still had a huge lead in the ability to deliver atomic weapons through cannons, bombs, missiles, and rockets.
The biggest problem for NATO was the resistance by some NATO allies to the use of American atomic weapons on German soil. Various measures were offered by the Americans to resolve the issue, as American doctrine (and its new Pentomic divisions) required their use, but the debate persisted. Some of the American leadership were relieved that this resistance was offered, while others believed that America should shoot first, and deal with "complications" later.
The French were dubious about America's romance with atomic weapons, but hadn't issued any ultimatums yet, though DeGaulle's star seemed to be rising again and there was American belief that he would offer greater resistance to US plans, than President Coty.
The fact was that West Berlin, isolated from the West, could not hold out for long, and the NATO window to respond was short. Action had to be taken quickly. Existing plans for the invasion of East Germany, being nothing more than a planning exercise, were dusted off, modified significantly, and being acted on, even as they were being re-written.
The Soviets were precipitating what they always insisted would happen; the west would prove to be the aggressor that the Soviets feared it to be, and they would enjoy the advantage of allowing NATO to expend itself in a hopeless advance into eastern Germany. There was no doubt in the minds of Soviet leadership, that they could out-last the American offensive. However, some were not sure it would be worth the cost.
It seemed that humanity was about to find out.
Fascinating narrative that feeds from paranoia of the period. The story may fall at being totally plausible, but the fears feel real.
ReplyDeleteAs I researched in trying to put together a back story for war, it became harder and harder to arrive at my destination. In the end, I overly relied on the mutual mistrust, and my obsession with putting little tanks on the tabletop.
DeleteYou are discovering the problem that underpins all good story telling. Plausible cause and effect, which ultimately is driven by emotions.
DeleteFortunately, emotions are not rational, and et voila, with a wave of the hand, pull the rabbit out of the hat: a plausible cause and effect that would otherwise be implausible.
It was a curious problem, and something that I hadn't expected to encounter. Afterall, all I was doing was creating an immersive environment for some games, and yet the plausibility issue was constantly a primary consideration.
Delete